A Return to Cold War Nuclear Deterrence?

By: Alexander Macturk

Early this month, Chief National Security Correspondent for CNN Jim Sciutto reported that senior Biden administration officials began “prepping rigorously” for a potential Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine. Sciutto’s report mirrors the unsettling trend of states with nuclear arsenals levying similar threats. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un welcomed the New Year with an order to “thoroughly annihilate” the United States and South Korea if attacked. Iran’s technological advancements have lowered the development time required to weaponize its nuclear research. Coupled with the instability in the region, prompted by the October 7 Hamas terrorist attack, Iran is worryingly poised to build its nuclear stockpile. 

Despite this, the validity of such threats and likelihood of nuclear proliferation remain unclear. Nonetheless, the U.S has exited its post-Cold War bliss and reentered a new period where  nuclear deterrence is no longer a theoretical strategic issue. In fact, the risk of use of nuclear weapons in combat is rising. Therefore, the national security community requires a strict reexamination of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, its application in the post-Cold War world, and a path forward.

For the U.S, the way to address nuclear deterrence varies between military and political leaders. Admiral Charles Richard, former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, has stressed American policymakers’ retreat from their myopia and sober realization that nuclear deterrence has always been integral to strategic deterrence. He emphasizes that nuclear deterrence itself has never been a universal deterrent. In fact, leaders such as Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev vigorously competed with each other for unilateral gain under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence. 

Failure to fully understand nuclear deterrence may lead to dangerous consequences. Nuclear weapons can inflict “uncontestable costs,” including an all-out nuclear assault. Nevertheless, nuclear deterrence does not exist separately from conventional deterrence. On a similar note, Sciutto also reported executive branch officials’ concerns that Russia may employ a “tactical or battlefield nuclear weapon.” The possibility of Vladimir Putin deploying tactical nuclear arms underlines the important duty of policymakers to prepare for any battlefield possibility and disregard the practice of solely relying on nuclear deterrence for international stability.

The poor application and stunted understanding of nuclear deterrence has evolved from the bipolar power struggle between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Admiral Richard has saliently warned that the twenty-first century authoritarian nuclear regimes may now stake their legitimacy on the ability to wage nuclear war. For example, North Korea passed a law in 2022 that explicitly states its status as a nuclear power. Authoritarian regimes do not employ traditional nuclear deterrence to persuade a potential adversary that the costs of a retaliatory nuclear attack far outweigh the benefits of an initial strike. In fact—and reflected in the language of the 2022 North Korea law—these authoritarian regimes misconstrue their nuclear arsenals not as a deterrent but as a strategic tool for “taking the initiative in war” and securing the continued viability of their regimes. 

To address this uncomfortable and present reality posed by the nuclear proliferation since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. must remain committed to international diplomacy aimed at limiting the development of nuclear arsenals. The U.S. must also push reduction treaties, like New START between the U.S. and Russia, as better alternatives to nuclear deterrence. Looking ahead, the U.S. should also work to lower tensions on the Korean Peninsula to ensure that Kim’s 2022 nuclear declaratory law has no chance of being practiced. If committed to pursuing renewed and reinvigorated commitment to nuclear proliferation and reducing tensions in conflicts involving nuclear powers, the U.S. would bring stability and international security and help make nuclear displays irrelevant on the global stage.

Indonesia’s Nickel Empire at the Expense of Human Rights

By: Apal Upadhyaya

Indonesia has more than quadrupled its nickel production in less than ten years, positioning the island nation to dominate the international nickel market. Nickel is necessary for the production of stainless steel and lithium-ion batteries found in essential everyday items like electric toothbrushes, laptops, computers, and cellphones. These batteries increasingly find use in next-generation technologies to power electric vehicles and e-bikes. Further, the demand for nickel is expected to increase 6-fold by 2030 fueled by growing demand for electric vehicles, a climate-friendly alternative form of transportation. Indonesia’s islands of Halmera and Sulawesi are home to the most identified nickel reserves in the country, making land there extremely lucrative for potential nickel mining companies. 

However, because of the land’s overwhelming value, thousands of Indonesian pepper farmers and other landowners have reported their land being seized by mining companies. Police intimidate locals and sell private lands well below market value with little negotiation. Furthermore, while the Indonesian government paints its nickel mining initiatives as green and energy friendly, the seizing and excavating of lands has resulted in thousands of acres of deforestation. The little regard and respect the Indonesian government and mining companies have for the Indonesian people whose ancestral lands have been seized blatantly violates property and human rights. While Indonesia has made it its goal to disrupt the international nickel market, it has lost its sense to protect the rights of its people. 

In Indonesia, formal land titles are difficult to acquire, especially for ancestral lands. In 2021, local governments began transferring land deeds to mining companies without the consent of the land’s residents. In one case, a widow and her family was given around $50 million Indonesian rupiah ($3,223) in exchange for the land. With the farm, the widow could make up to 6 million rupiah ($386) in one month from her harvests, and without her farm-based income, the widow has resorted to to selling cooked food at a stall to make a fraction of that income she would have made if she still had her land. Notably, these land deals and disputes are predatory and disproportionately affect Indonesia’s poorest populations. This exploitative approach to nickel mining is not going away. The number of land disputes increased from 1,520 conflicts between 2005-2015 to 2,939 conflicts between 2015-2023 under President Joko Widodo. This has affected 135,608 households, or close to one million people. 

On the island of Gelam, which is part of the Kendawangan conservation area zone, local government officials claim that land deeds were only given to mining companies because of residents’ requests. Residents refute this claim and argue that they never willingly gave up their lands to mining companies. Local Indonesian governments and officials have abused the lack of land deeds among their poorest populations to better position themselves for success in future nickel mining operations. The Indonesian government has recently become a controlling shareholder of  PT Vale Indonesia, one of the mining companies seizing land in Sulawesi. Thus, the government of Indonesia is complicit in this seizing of land affecting almost a million citizens. The government’s gross disregard of its own citizens violates the property rights and threatens the livelihoods of the millions of people who live off their land to gain a reliable income. 

The Indonesian government frames this focus on nickel as a push towards clean energy, but massive deforestation and pollution undermines the government of President Joko Widodo’s goals. Over 13,173 acres (5,331 hectares) of forest have been cleared on Halmahera, driving away deer and boars and polluting the water of local rivers. PT Weda Bay Nickel, the largest nickel miner on Halmahera, has deforested 3,600 acres of forest as of 2022. Widodo has sought to support developing industries, hasten recognition of land ownership, and slow deforestation. However, based on the actions of mining groups backed by the Indonesian government, deforestation in Indonesia still continues. 

While Indonesian nickel mining can make the nation a key player in the international nickel market, the violation of property and human rights to undertake such a project cannot be understated. Seizing and evicting people from ancestral lands for the sake of mine development is wrong. Excavating such lands in a way that pollutes key water sources and destabilizes the surrounding environment is wrong. Indonesian policymakers must stop issuing permits to mine and hold leaders accountable for violations of community members’ rights. If safeguards and restrictions do not materialize, the people of these islands will be displaced and the environment will be destroyed, both reduced to an afterthought of innovation. 

Chaos in ECOWAS and Regionalism’s Regression: America’s Role

By: Wyatt Dayhoff

The Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, was founded in 1975 to advance economic integration across fifteen West African states as they struggled to cope with skyrocketing debt and the enduring legacy of colonialism. When civil wars and political instability hampered its efforts, the organization pivoted to facilitate peace and security in the region. Since then, it has helped end numerous political crises, playing a large role in the region’s complete democratic stability from 2015-2020, and has been hailed as the most successful model of regional governance in Africa.

Then, on January 28th, 2024, three of its founding members declared their resignation from the bloc, sending shockwaves through the organization and the continent as a whole. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, all engulfed by coups since 2020, blamed the organization for kowtowing to foreign powers and betraying the roots of the organization. 

Why did they leave? All members of the new “Alliance of Sahel States” (AES) had been facing scrutiny, both verbal and economic, of their junta-led regimes from ECOWAS and Western powers prior to their secession. Mali, for example, was slapped with sanctions by the bloc while it endeavored to recover from COVID- and Ukraine-induced shocks, causing devastating inflation and price hikes for basic commodities. These sanctions, in tandem with an apparent failure to prevent terrorism, turned public sentiment against ECOWAS, which is now seen by many as a puppet of the West. The Alliance’s grievances, then, are not surprising, and ECOWAS was unable to negotiate a return to democracy as it had previously done so well. This followed multiple failures to intervene when other West African leaders (Ouattara in Cote D’Ivoire and Conde in Ghana) used manipulative tactics to receive extra terms. 

Even before this landmark event, experts noted that ECOWAS was at a crossroads. Divided and discombobulated, the bloc was hemorrhaging authority and legitimacy. Now, its raison d’etre teeters on the brink: outside of its confines, the organization cannot hope to even attempt to restore democracy to the three nations, much less facilitate trade. The AES will likely suffer, too; on February 19, Niger defaulted up to $520 million in debt, and without access to regional markets the nation will plunge even deeper into economic strife. Sahelian border closures will recreate the very problems that ECOWAS was formed to solve. ECOWAS lifted existing sanctions on February 25th to account for the default, but it still remains unable to provide broader support given Niger’s lack of membership.

The future paints a grim picture for the West African region, reflecting larger concerns about regionalism in developing nations. ASEAN, arguably the most influential regional bloc, was fractured by Myanmar’s 2022 coup and remains paralyzed. Regionalism and multilateralism, concepts that showed such promise in the 2010s, now lay tattered after COVID’s enormous economic and political impact. Instead, neo-Cold War thinking has surged, with countries joining either the Chinese or the Western camp. While China and the United States are working together to create a debt relief package for emerging markets, bandwagoning with one party or the other has become the norm, making aid and support contingent on politics. 

The world can ill afford a continuation of this trend. Democracy has declined precipitously in recent years and remains shaky, economic growth has stagnated in many countries, and global income inequality is at the same levels as the early 20th century. In other words, developing nations are not developing, and the lack of a regionally-based framework for cooperation and resistance to outside pressures certainly adds to the strain. 

While the states of ECOWAS must work better in tandem, the United States has also been complicit in such stagnation, repeatedly burying coalition-led plans in the United Nations and imposing neoliberal economic deregulation that has lowered living standards. In pursuing its own economic interests, America has often neglected the needs of others, and without a profound shift in how it approaches developing nations, it will continue to draw the ire of those it tries to court. 

American partnership, not peonage, is needed. Otherwise, organizations like ECOWAS will continue to falter under adversity because positions taken become attached to big brother. Given its size, it is difficult for America to not loom large and lurk in the back of decision-making. That said, acknowledging that intervention has and continues to fail is needed for American policymakers to help actualize a more inclusive future that benefits both American and its partners. 

Until then, we can only hope that the trust destroyed during the pandemic can be reignited going forward. West Africa has come a long way already, and effective institutions, if maintained, could secure the livelihoods of some of the youngest, fastest-growing populations in the world.